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* Translated from the French by Roger Depledge. The project behind this issue of RECEO 
was funded in particular by INTAS (International Association for the promotion of co-ope-
ration with scientists from the New Independent States [NIS] of the former Soviet Union) 
under the title “Measuring the socio-demographic changes – empirical evidence. Gender 
and generation in three EU and two NIS countries – EU integration and its new nearest 
neighbours”, Open Call, 2006- 2008 (coord. Alain Blum) and by Agence Nationale de la 
Recherche (ANR) under the title “Éclairer le comportement démographique de la France 
par la comparaison internationale”, Programme Blanc, 2005-2008 (coord. Cécile Lefèvre).
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makes it possible to estimate the role of socio-cultural and more political 
determining factors in the demographic changes we are studying. 
It may be thought regrettable not to have included two other countries, 
one from Western Europe (Germany or Italy, say) and one from Central 
and Eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic or Bulgaria, which were 
under Soviet political influence until 1989 and are now Member States 
of the European Union. The absence of these countries is due to the fact 
that it was not possible during the research period to have access to their 
GGS data2.
Historically, Russia and Georgia shared a common political territory 
from the 19th century as the various kingdoms and principalities that 
make up Georgia’s present territory were gradually absorbed by the Rus-
sian Empire, during the conquest of Transcaucasia that lasted from 1801 
to 1878. After the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the short-
lived independent Transcaucasian Federation, created in 1918, Georgia 
was independent for only a short time from 1918 before becoming a Soviet 
republic. Lithuania declared its independence at the time of the Russian 
Revolution, after being part of the Tsarist Empire, but was re-absorbed 
into the Soviet Union under the German-Soviet Pact of 1939. 
All three countries, like France, share a common historical experience, 
namely a 20th century marked by the Second World War, whose consequences 
and sequels were widely different for each of them: Russia was a major 
actor; its losses, especially military, were huge. Lithuania was annexed by the 
USSR in 1940, invaded by Germany in 1941 and then returned to the Soviet 
Union. It suffered massive deportation to Siberia beginning in 1939, which 
continued after the retreat of German forces, the extermination of its Jewish 
population during German occupation, and the instability of the immediate 
post-war years, with various forms of resistance to Soviet occupation. Geor-
gia in its present borders was an integral part of the USSR. It took part in the 
war but did not lose as many people as Russia and Lithuania. France’s loss 
of life was far less than that of these three countries, but the country was still 
deeply marked by the Second World War.
After 1945, the four countries selected for this study found themselves 
on two sides as part of the post-war polarisation of Europe until 1991. At 
this date the Soviet pole disintegrated: Lithuania was the first country of the 
former USSR to declare its independence, on 11 March 1990. Georgia then 
quickly declared its own, on 9 April 1991. Not until the USSR dissolved on 
25 December 1991 did their independence become effective, enabling these 
2. Of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which were under Soviet influence after 
the Second World War, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary carried out a GGS sur-
vey. Germany and Italy, in Western Europe, did the same. We had hoped to have access to 
the German data, but this was not possible before the end of the research period.
This special issue is devoted to recent changes in families in France, 
Georgia, Lithuania and Russia. The changes involve three major sets of 
factors: the anthropological dimension shown by patterns of intra-family 
relationships in the four countries; the political dimension, since each of 
the four has its own special history (three of them sharing a history over 
various periods); and an economic and social dimension, which constrains 
or frees demographic trajectories and is itself a combination of long-term 
transnational and national trends. The value of this arrangement is more 
heuristic than demonstrative. It is intended to place the various papers 
within the general framework of demographic change and provides a view 
of the main trends revealed by the composite indicators and measure-
ments recorded by the GGS (Generations and Gender Surveys)1 carried 
out from 2004 to 2006 using a common questionnaire in the four countries 
selected (see Appendices 1 and 2).
The trends measured by the composite indicators reflect long-term 
demographic histories in which countries converge or diverge, the imme-
diate demographic effects of public policy, and the effects of more general 
political and social history. The measurements, based on statistical house-
hold surveys, offer a different perspective, with both synchronous and dia-
chronous elements and details of family formation. They reveal changes in 
behaviour that the usual indicators do not measure. They can be used to 
monitor in detail how families are constituted and to identify noticeably 
different practices beneath demographic trends that may appear to be 
equivalent or convergent. 
1. Why theSe Four countrieS?
The selection of countries for this study may appear surprising. What do 
France, Georgia, Lithuania and Russia have in common to justify including 
them in the same analysis, without studying, say, Germany, Italy or Spain? 
The first reason is a practical one: four of the various research teams who 
carried out the same survey were used to working together, and further-
more were ready to share the data they had collected. But that is not the 
main reason. The purpose of these studies is to compare a set of countries 
that long shared a common political and economic history, but with quite 
distinct cultural history and anthropological patterns, against another 
country, France, that had not shared that common history. This comparison 
1. The Generations and Gender Project (GGP) was launched in 2000 by the Population Acti-
vities Unit (PAU) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The 
first wave of a three-part series of international surveys (Generations and Gender Surveys) 
were carried out for the project, with data already collected from Bulgaria, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania and Russia. For details, http://www.
unece.org/pau/ggp/Welcome.html
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The third, socio-economic, dimension is related to the differences 
between education systems, operation of the labour market, social stra-
tification, housing access, social policy of financial support for families, 
and even differentials in the access to healthcare and birth control. It also 
covers the country’s social and economic organisation: social stratification, 
operating rules of the labour market, access to housing, etc.
Of the four, only France has had a market economy for most of its recent 
history. The other three had 50 or 70 years of an authoritarian regime in 
which the economy was planned and access to employment strictly defined 
by the State. Life histories and occupational careers were circumscribed 
by a system of social protection whereby unemployment did not official-
ly exist and the employer might well provide services and accommoda-
tion for their staff. The State took over part of family life with a network 
of crèches and kindergartens it had created. At the same time, the State 
paradoxically encouraged families to develop intergenerational solidarity, 
which was supposed to make up for the inadequate supply of housing and 
basic consumer goods, especially food, typical of a shortage economy.
In the early 1990s, the upheavals in the three East European countries 
involved first the liberalisation of the economy. This led, among other things, 
to a considerable rise in the cost of living, as state aid to families dwin-
dled and the system of social institutions (crèches, hospitals, etc.) fell into 
disrepair. However, the three countries soon took different paths. After a 
decade of chaos, Russia and Lithuania began to benefit from the changes. 
The Russian economy strengthened in the first years after 2000 as a result 
of the rise in commodity prices on international markets, key resources for 
a country exporting raw materials, and the Lithuanian economy gained 
from membership of the European Union in 2004. Georgia was an excep-
tion, making no economic progress in the absence of new opportunities, 
not to mention the heavy burden of the wars of independence (Abkhazia, 
Adzharia, South Ossetia).
2. Demographic context
The sources used in this research are of two sorts: first, selected com-
posite demographic indicators taken from national censuses or surveys. 
These are used to follow diachronic trends and position our analysis within 
the usual practice for observing demographic change over the years. The 
second main source is an international survey, the “Generation and Gen-
der Surveys” (GGS). Based on a United Nations initiative, these surveys 
are longitudinal. The idea is that three successive waves are carried out at 
three-year intervals in all participating countries, including the four in this 
study. The data on which the papers are based are taken from the first sur-
countries to assume autonomous existence. The newly independent states 
undertook policies of radical change with widely varying results. Georgia, 
unlike some other former Soviet republics, did not achieve political stability. 
Lithuania, on the other hand, joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.
The comparison we make reflects anthropological and cultural dimen-
sions of each country’s long-term history. The situations observable now, 
rather than past trends, reveal these diversities. The anthropological 
dimension covers those factors perceived in the relations between men 
and women and in family values, particularly those relating to marriage 
and the differentiation of gender roles. This anthropological dimension 
contributes to the formation of spaces organised along religious, family 
and cultural lines, combining in institutions such as marriage. In this res-
pect, each of the four countries displays widely different and internally 
varying patterns. Lithuania may well be firmly situated within a Catholic 
tradition that links it with Poland, with which it shared a common history 
centuries ago. But it is also linked in a more complex manner with the 
Germanic and Scandinavian areas of Europe. These effects could be seen 
when Soviet Lithuania stood apart not only from Russia, but also from the 
other two Baltic countries, Estonia and Latvia. For example, abortion and 
divorce were less frequent than in the other two. Georgia, again, may well 
belong to the Caucasus but it is still different from its neighbours, Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan. The highly patriarchal dimension in family relations 
remains strong and marks relations within the couple, the formation of 
unions and forms of mutual aid.
Family relationships in Russia are also marked by patriarchal patterns, 
but less than in Georgia, and the divergences are greater. However, the 
early date of the formation of unions and first births seems to be a double 
effect of a Soviet socio-economic past, with its housing shortages and 
special forms of cohabitation between generation, and of older, deeper 
reasons reflecting the Hajnal Line3 dividing a zone to the east of early 
marriage and complex family structures from a zone to the west of late 
marriage and nuclear families. Naturally, this pattern is now nuanced or 
even contested, but Russia does appear to retain a particular pattern: early 
family formation and frequent intergenerational relations. 
Last but not least, France is marked by different forms of mutual aid and 
relationships between relatives, closer to the nuclear family, leading to less 
intergenerational aid than in Russia and Georgia. The types of relationship 
established within the circle of relatives are not patriarchal or patrilocal 
but much more symmetrical.
3. The Hajnal line divides a zone of early marriage and complex family structures to the east 
from a zone of late marriage and nuclear families to the west. Cf. Burguière et al., Histoire de 
la Famille, Stock, Paris, (1986) 1994.
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First let us place the countries under study within their general demo-
graphic context. Their population sizes vary widely, of course, from Russia 
with close to 144 million and France nearly half Russia (about 61 million) 
to Georgia and Lithuania, each below 5 million. Demographic trends are 
also different. The French population continues to grow, mainly by natural 
increase but also by migration, whereas the population of the other three 
countries is declining as a result of high mortality, exacerbated in Georgia 
and Lithuania by substantial emigration. Russia stands out for its popula-
tion decline over many years, attenuated by immigration, mainly of Rus-
sians from the former Soviet republics. In these countries migration is a 
crucial factor. Many families in Georgia and Lithuania are now split up by 
an emigration not of families but mainly of men going to work in Western 
Europe, especially the British Isles, for the Lithuanians, and in Russia for 
the Georgians.
Soviet history even affected behaviour concerning people’s lives and 
deaths. This history persists even now in terms of health and mortality 
(Figure 1). Whereas in the early 1960s the Soviet republics and Western 
countries were fairly similar in these areas, a sharp divergence appeared 
at the start of the 1970s, when all the countries of Western Europe began 
a radical change in health policies, particularly for the prevention of car-
diovascular disease and cancer control. These countries’ mortality decli-
ned rapidly and, not least, regularly. Conversely, the mortality of countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics increased, with a 
continual decline in life expectancy. Furthermore, the short-term changes 
were remarkably synchronous, demonstrating the sensitivity of various 
components of the USSR to specific measures: accelerated deterioration 
throughout the USSR in the mid-1970s, interruption and sudden impro-
vement in the mid-1980s, following draconian laws against alcoholism 
(close to prohibition), then synchronous fluctuations as a consequence of 
a return to the previous situation by damped oscillation5. Then the paral-
lel nature of these trends, fluctuations and oscillations, following Soviet 
developments year by year with remarkable unanimity, suddenly broke 
down when the Soviet Union collapsed, showing how far the changes in 
mortality were the consequence of belonging to a region that had shared 
a common political history and the same state. The divergence of morta-
lity trends appeared in the early 1990s in most of the countries of Central 
Europe, which rapidly emerged from a long stagnation of their mortality 
rates. Lithuania moved apart from the Russian trend from the mid-1990s, 
but not markedly. From the end of the 1980s, Russia’s life expectancy fell 
5. For the interpretation of these fluctuations, see A. Avdeev, A. Blum, S. Zakharov & 
E. Andreev, “Réaction d’une population  hétérogène à une perturbation. Un modèle d’inter-
prétation des évolutions de la mortalité en Russie”, Population, vol. 52, n° 1, 1997, pp. 7-44.
vey wave carried out in 2004 in Russia, 2005 in France and 2006 in Georgia 
and Lithuania. The main advantage of this survey for the four countries 
under study, in 2004 for Russia and 2006 for Lithuania, is that it is based 
on a questionnaire with a common core for all participating countries. This 
core questionnaire, in English, was the reference, and the sample sizes and 
structures were also precisely defined in order to achieve homogeneity and 
comparability (see Appendix 1 and 2).
Nevertheless, some divergences remain, as a result of survey practice 
in each country, and also the impossibility of achieving strict equivalence 
between the wording of the questions, since even if a question is translated 
in strictly equivalent terms, the meaning may differ between countries4.
tABle 1 
Selected demographic parameters (totals in thousands)
a: In thousands; b: children per 100 women; c: in years
* Estimated, since the authorities did not have access to data from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Without these two regions, the population was 4.435m in 2000, 4.289m in 2005
Sources: National statistical yearbooks and INED database (http://www.ined.fr/pop_chifres)
4. See P. Sebille & A. Régnier-Lolier, Aménagements du questionnaire Generatoins and Gen-
der Surveys en France (vague 1), Ined, coll. “Documents de travail”, N° 144, Paris, 2007, 191 p.
Country France Georgia Lithuania Russia 
Population (1990) a 56,577 5,424 3,694 147,662 
Population (2000) a 58,849 4,672* 3,512 145,559 
Population (1/1/2005) a 60,825 4,321 3,425 143,474 
Population (1/1/2006) a 61,167 4,401 3,403 142,221 
Births (2005) a 767 50 30 1,502 
Births (2006)a 774 48 31 1,480 
Total fertility rate (2005)b 198 139 130 130 
Deaths (2005) a 507 43 44 2,294 
Deaths (2006) a 520 42 45 2,167 
Life expectancy at birth (M 
- 2006) c 77.2 69.8 65.3 60.4 
Life expectancy at birth (F 
– 2006) c 84.0 78.5 77.1 73.2 
Natural increase (2006) a 280 5.5 -13.5 -687.1 
Balance of migration 
(2006)a 115 -12.1 -4.9 154.5 
Total increase (2006) a 395 -6.6 -18.4 -532.6 
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figure 2
Infant mortality rate (1960-2005)
Sources: National statistical yearbooks and INED Population database (http://www.ined.fr/pop_
chiffres).
The synchronous fertility trends in the three former Soviet republics 
are due to the combined effect of historical, political and economic factors, 
while the different levels are more the effect of cultural and anthropolo-
gical factors (Figure 3). During the 1980s, while most European countries 
(except France) had declining fertility, the figures for Georgia, Lithuania 
and Russia remained high. The trace left by the paternalistic Soviet State 
explains the symmetry of trends in these three countries, enhanced by the 
pronatalist policy adopted in 19816, the date when fertility rose. These 
mainly affected birth timing – bringing childbearing forward — rather than 
completed fertility by cohort7. The steep decline that followed, in Russia, 
Estonia and Latvia, is also due to catching up. The context of economic, 
political and social crisis in the 1990s most probably played a part in the 
immediate decline in the birth rate during this period. This decreased fer-
tility intensity was accompanied by the first signs of change in the timing 
6. In particular, paid parental leave; A. Avdeev & A. Monnier, “À la découverte de la fécon-
dité russe contemporaine”, Population, vol. 49, n° 4-5, 1994, pp. 859-901.
7. S. Zakharov, “Demografičeskij analiz effekta mer semejnoj politiki v Rossii 1980-kh 
gg.” (Demographic analysis of the effect of family policy measures in 1980s Russia), in 
T.M. Maleva & O.V. Sinjavskaja, eds., Roditeli i deti, mužčiny i ženščiny v sem’e i obščestve 
(Children and parents, men and women in family and society), volume 1, Moscow, NISP, 
2007, pp. 267-312..
sharply and has only shown weak signs of improvement after the sharp 
fall of the 1990s.
figure 1  
Male life expectancy at birth (1960-2005)
Sources: National statistical yearbooks and INED Population database (http://www.ined.fr/pop_
chiffres).
Trends in infant mortality confirm these common then separate deve-
lopments, although they involve some difficulties in interpretation as a 
result of simple questions of statistical measurement (Figure 2). For many 
years, the nature of the indicator used to measure the infant mortality rate 
in the USSR was controversial. It is now known that this measurement, 
which excluded a certain number of perinatal deaths that were included 
elsewhere in Europe, underestimated the actual figure. It is also accep-
ted that part of the rise observed everywhere in the mid-1970s was the 
consequence of improved registration due to a monitoring campaign car-
ried out by the statistics directorate. So some synchronous movements were 
more the result of alterations in measurement than real changes; the rise 
in infant mortality in Lithuania and Estonia after 1991 is the consequence 
of the use of international standards for measuring it. Nevertheless, the 
general trend is downward, except in Georgia.
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USSR in general. Since 2007-2008, this clear cultural dimension has been 
combined with the emergence of a policy encouraging marriage, strongly 
marked by Catholic culture and offering married couples a privileged sta-
tus compared to other couples. The rise in the number of births outside 
wedlock that began in the early 1990s then stopped. There remains the 
apparently unexpected phenomenon in Georgia, where the number of 
out-of-wedlock births has risen sharply. This is basically the consequence 
of a disaffection with registered civil marriage and a shift to private reli-
gious ceremonies8.
figure 4 
Proportion of births out of wedlock as a percentage of total live births
Sources: National statistical yearbooks and INED Population database (http://www.ined.fr/pop_
chiffres).
This section has outlined the main demographic trends in the four 
countries under study and shown their similarities and differences, but it 
needs to be complemented by a perspective approach to the anthropologi-
cal, historical, social and economic factors that determine the major socio-
demographic changes described in the nine articles. The GGS survey data 
are a rich source of information here.
8. I. Badurashvili, R. Cheishvili, E. Kapanadze, S. Tsiklauri & M. Sirbiladze, Gender Relations 
in Modern Georgian Society, UNFPA-GCPR, Tbilisi, 2008, 86 p.
of the first birth. The very young age of mothers in the 1970s and 1980s 
gradually moved more closely to that elsewhere in Europe. 
figure 3 
Total fertility rate (1960-2005)
Sources: National statistical yearbooks and INED Population database (http://www.ined.fr/pop_
chiffres).
The variations in levels are due to cultural and anthropological factors, 
particularly in Georgia and Lithuania in 1960-1990: the patriarchal family 
in one case and Catholicism in the other heavily affected family behaviour, 
especially marriage, where change is shown by the number of births out of 
wedlock (Figure 4). In the early 1960s in most European countries, a birth 
out of wedlock usually meant a birth outside a couple, often unwanted 
and unrecognised. At present, it means a child born to an informal union. 
The Scandinavian countries led this development and France followed a 
few years later. Currently in France, one birth in two occurs in an informal 
union and the fertility behaviour of married couples does not differ from 
that of other couples.
However, these changes also show the complex but real relationship 
between anthropological and political dimensions. In Estonia, for exam-
ple, a country demographically identified as Scandinavian, informal unions 
developed quickly after the collapse of the USSR. Estonians’ integration 
in the USSR had limited this trend for years but not prevented it entirely. 
In Lithuania, strong attachment to Catholic values had the effect of limit-
ing the rise in out-of-wedlock births even more than in Estonia and the 
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
300
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Average number of children (for 100 women)
RussiaGeorgiaFrance Lithuania
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
France Georgia
Lithuania Russia
Proportion (for 100 live birth)
VOLUME 40, SEPTEMBER-DÉCEMBER 2009
A. Blum, C. lefèvre, P. SeBille, i. BAdurAShvili, A. régnier-loilier,  
v. StAnkuniene, o. SinyAvSkAyA
introduCtion: internAtionAl ComPAriSonS16 17
pin family, friendship and neighbourhood relations that differ between 
regions and communities.
One of these forms of exchange is of particular importance: family sup-
port. This is very important for men or women when they find themselves 
isolated, either single or widowed or divorced (Figure 5). In the case of 
divorce, family support usually means return to the parents’ home or 
continued cohabitation. This is particularly true in Georgia, where cultu-
ral patterns of family organisation encourage the existence of complex 
households. Georgian men often live with their parents at whatever point 
in their marital history, whether single or in a couple. Although the pro-
portion of men living with at least one parent declines with age, this is not 
so much the consequence of their leaving the parental home but rather of 
the parents dying.
In France, on the contrary, men only rarely live in the parental home, 
least of all after the age of thirty. Women do so slightly more, but once they 
have moved out, very few of them return to live with their parents, even 
after a divorce or widowhood. In France, leaving the parental home is the-
refore usually final, whether one lives as a couple or alone afterwards. In 
Lithuania, the behaviour of men and women in terms of leaving the paren-
tal home falls between the two. Moving out is final but constrained by the 
difficulties of access to housing and a stable income. So there are more 
men and women who live with their parents or parents-in-law after for-
ming a union or marital breakdown. Russia also seems to occupy an inter-
mediate position, with the emergence of renewed cohabitation imposed by 
the difficult economic conditions of the last decade.
Family organisation and cohabitation where it occurs also reveal the 
bonds that unite family members and the gender relations bound up with 
them. In Georgia, for example, the eldest son’s care for his elderly parents 
is related to his responsibility within the sibling group. These relations 
defined within the family and the gender relations observed throughout 
society at large reflect an anthropological dimension that may be exacer-
bated by economic pressures, particularly during crises, when women leave 
the work market sooner and in greater numbers than men. Similarly, fami-
ly and matrimonial practices are connected with the social status of men 
and women and the customs laid down by society.
In Georgia, marriage is not followed by a clear break between men 
and their families. The principle of patrilocal coresidence means that the 
husband stays with his parents and his wife joins him. Men’s attachment 
to their parents’ household is particularly noticeable in the sharp diffe-
rence in men and women’s behaviour after the end of a marriage. Whether 
widowhood, divorce or separation, men remain attached to their parents’ 
home, and either stay there or return. Women are much more likely to live 
3. Socio-Demographic changeS anD Determining FactorS
3.1 A CleAr AnthroPologiCAl dimenSion – fAmily mutuAl Aid And CohA-
BitAtion
It is now established that family structures long retain the traces of pat-
terns of intra-family relations subject to a clear anthropological dimension: 
the permanent features often override social and political changes9. For 
example, when housing conditions changed or rapid urbanisation and rural 
exodus brought into towns rural families for whom housing arrangements 
and degree of proximity among relatives were suddenly altered, the orga-
nisation of family life was modified. Forms of mutual aid took over from 
cohabitation. There was a shift from family patterns dominated by shared 
participation in housework, economically important farm work and par-
tial pooling of resources (even if finances might still be controlled by the 
biological family), to a family organisation with new types of mutual aid, 
informal exchange, circulation of information from the extended family 
and other outside sources. A system emerged in which aid was once again 
mainly provided by the State. Whether for financial aid or tax allowances, 
family support or childcare, official channels were increasingly used, and 
support from the extended family was only a supplement to the aid offered 
by institutions.
It is particularly instructive to observe the situation in the successor 
states to the USSR, since they all comprise a widely proclaimed unified 
welfare state system superposed over traditional patterns of mutual aid 
that vary widely by region. The combination of or conflict between these 
patterns provides an indicator of how anthropological heritage copes with 
the development of more intrusive state paternalism. The confrontation 
between reality, often a survival economy, and stated support from the 
state, produces responses that involve exchanges of goods and services that 
are often monetary and “informal”10. These exchanges consist of providing 
a service to a particular person in the expectation of support in return, an 
indirect support that may occur through other networks. This is a form of 
insurance, a costly form because to obtain a service that is not determined 
in advance, the individual is obliged to provide services to a large number 
of people who may or may not provide support in the future. Although 
this form of generalised exchange is due to the inadequacies of the social 
protection and welfare state system, which cannot assume its functions in a 
stagnating economy, it is also superposed on ancient practices that under-
9. Hervé Le Bras et Emmanuel Todd, L’invention de la France. Atlas anthropologique et 
politique, Le Livre de Poche, Paris, 1981.
10. Myriam Désert, « Le débat russe sur l’informel », Questions de recherches, n° 17, CERI/
Sciences Po, n° 17, mai 2006 ; http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/cerifrpublica/question/menu.
htm
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The first stage in forming a family, marked by a first union, which for 
the pre-1960 cohorts is often a marriage, only occurs after the end of edu-
cation, entrance to the labour market and leaving the parental home. It is 
quickly followed by the birth of a child conceived after the union. For the 
1930s cohorts, who began their working lives just after the Second World 
War, the median ages indicate that there was more than 15 years between 
the end of education or access to a first job and the formation of a union 
or the birth of a first child. Three phenomena are strongly dissociated: an 
economic one, relating education and employment; a sociological one, 
namely the social representation of adulthood, determining the leaving of 
the parental home; and a demographic one, the social expression of the 
formation of the family, relating marriage and the birth of the first child.
In the USSR the stages occur much more closely together and the order 
may change. Where the end of education and leaving the parental home 
are close events12, they are quickly followed by a first union and a first 
child. In Russia, for example, all the stages occur in less than five years, 
whereas in France they extend over more than ten. It is not unusual for 
the first union in Russia to be formed before the end of education and the 
first child to be born while the parents are still students. The gap is slightly 
larger in Lithuania and Georgia, because people leave the parental home 
sooner. The situation in Russia is evidence of more difficult housing condi-
tions there than in the outlying republics of the Soviet Union. But in all the 
Soviet republics the state system of access to employment, education and 
relations between families and State broke down the dependence between 
the formation of a family and educational and professional careers. The 
distinction observed in France between the various stages in life history 
is erased. These forms of expression of adulthood occur over a shorter 
period, in an order that is not always the same, since a given stage may 
occur before or after another13.
12. In Russia, the survey did not contain a question on first job.
13. See the article in this issue by Pascal Sébille, Alain Blum and Serge Zakharov comparing 
Russia and France.
away from their parents’ home, whatever their marital situation once they 
have entered a union. This is without doubt one of the most characteris-
tic features of Georgian family structure compared with the other three 
countries under study.
However, as we have shown, the family patterns revealed in coresidence 
between family members only reflect a part of the relationships between 
parents and children. Housing constraints and urban lifestyles may indeed 
modify family structures but do not radically modify the nature of the rela-
tionships between parents and children. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
frequency of children’s visits to their parents (Figure 6). For example, in 
Georgia, family relationships are strongly marked by gender relations wit-
hin the family. The priority relationship of men with their parents, as seen 
in the patrilocal family structure, is also seen in the visits men make to their 
parents. These are much more frequent among men than among women11. 
3.2 entrAnCe into Adult life
“Entrance into adult life”, via a series of stages (leaving parental home, 
end of education, first job, first union, birth of first child) occurs in various 
orders, with discrepancies that indicate either a weak causal link or no 
link at all. These stages are not always strictly ordered either in a given 
country or over time. However, despite great variability and different 
order of stages, due to individual, social or economic factors, the similari-
ties between these stages show that there are close correlations between 
these various points of entrance into adult life. For the oldest cohorts, there 
is a clear distinction between France and the other countries: the polari-
sation between East and West is sharply expressed. This reflects different 
relationships between the political and economic systems, particularly 
between access to employment and formation of the family.
During the period under study, the end of education in France is quickly 
followed by access to a first job, but for these cohorts it is not until some 
years later that respondent left the parental home. This move is the 
consequence of access to economic independence and adult status. It 
occurs when the conditions for independence are assured. This reasoning 
explains the remarkable stability of the median age of leaving the parental 
home (Figure 7). The combination of an economic system — economic 
independence required to leave the parental home — and a more anthro-
pological one — ideas about the age of independence, partly explain the 
time elapsed between the end of education and access to a first job and 
between that and leaving the parental home.
11. See the article in this issue by Arnaud Régnier-Loilier, Irina Badurashvili and Shorena 
Tsiklauri comparing France and Georgia.
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Sources: Generations and Gender Surveys (see Appendix 1)
figure 5
Proportions of men and women living with at least one of their parents or their partner’s parents. By marital situation.
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the other stages in Russia and Lithuania, and then only for men. Georgia 
is characterised by a close association and concentration of all the stages14. 
The highly gendered and recent nature of the dissociation for men of the 
birth of the first child and the other life stages is the consequence of eco-
nomic changes rather than any modification in people’s aspirations or dee-
ply held attitudes. The collapse of a paternalistic State has forced men to 
wait for a certain stability of employment and a later stage in their careers 
before forming a family15.
3.3 multiPle PAtternS of CouPle formAtion And diSSolution
The patterns of couple formation demonstrate this strange combination 
of the marks left by a shared Soviet past, which hampered the develop-
ment of new types of cohabitation, and the real anthropological distance 
between the four countries under study. More evidence, when one exa-
mines the transformations of recent years, of the forms of “conservatism” 
and change that express themselves differently between France and Rus-
sia on the one hand and Lithuania and Georgia on the other.
In all four countries, marriage is no longer necessarily the pattern for the 
first union. In France, this change to an extension of informal unions as a 
first passage towards life as a couple goes back a long way. As early as the 
1960s, the number of marriages began to fall. In Russia, this did not happen 
until the end of the 1970s. Marriage was then increasingly replaced by the 
formation of an informal union. The contrast between these two countries 
and Lithuania and Georgia is striking. It was not until much later, after the 
collapse of the USSR, that informal unions as a first step before marriage 
began to spread among the Lithuanian and Georgian populations. In the 
latter two countries, membership of the Soviet Union, which hampered 
the development of these informal unions, was combined with a deeper 
social dimension, meaning that marriage still remains the most legitimate 
form of union. This comparison between norms inherited from the politi-
cal regime and those issuing from society strongly influenced marital beha-
viour in Georgia and Lithuania. 
14. The sharp rise in age at leaving home in the late 1990s was due to a reform of military 
service. See the article in this issue by Arnaud Régnier-Loilier, Irina Badurashvili and Sho-
rena Tsiklauri.
15. See the article in this issue by Oxana Sinyavskaya and Ariane Pailhé.
figure 6
Proportion of children with at least one parent alive who visit their parents at 
least once a week, by gender of child and parent.
Sources: Generations and Gender Surveys (see Appendix 1)
The developments monitored from the first cohorts to those of the 
1980s, who had just ended their education, display major transformations, 
with in France, a shorter period, or even reversal, between the end of edu-
cation or first job, leaving the parental home and birth of the first child. 
The stability of the age at leaving the parental home and of formation of a 
union contrasts with the rapid increase in age at the birth of the first child 
and the slow but regular increase in age at the end of education and access 
to the labour market. This dissociation between stages is not observed in 
the other countries: only the birth of the first child is moving away from 
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figure 8
Proportion of marriages preceded by an informal union, by marriage cohort
figure 7
“Entrance into adult life” – median age at various stages of adult life by male 
and female cohorts
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figure 9
Proportion of men (women) living with a partner, having a non-resident  
partner, or with no partner, by age
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figure 10
Union survival rate by sex and year of union  
(per 100 unions formed in given year).
In Russia, on the other hand, the match between political change and 
marital behaviour quickly led, on the collapse of the USSR, to the emer-
gence of informal unions as a first stage before marriage. These demogra-
phic changes in Russia reflect the lifting of a constraint that the Soviet 
socio-political and economic model imposed on the population’s marital 
behaviour.
The persistence in Lithuania and Georgia of a socio-cultural model 
in which marriage remains a central institution is confirmed by the slow 
development in these countries of models of declared partnership without 
cohabitation and the late timing of the formation of couples, usually in 
the form of marriage. The expression of what we may call “conservatism”, 
namely the persistence of values attached to the institution of marriage, is 
much stronger in these two countries. 
They appear to be two quite different types of society. One is repre-
sented by France and Russia. Here the institution of marriage is defined as 
a recognition by the State of the forms of relationship that form a family, 
and it is no longer the core of family relationships. The other type, where 
marriage remains a “pillar” of society, can be seen in Lithuania, still under-
pinned by Catholicism, and in Georgia, where marriage is the expression 
of the patriarchal and hierarchical patterns of family relationships.
The nature of marital behaviour in France does not mean that the 
State plays no role in supporting families. On the contrary, the State is 
seen as having an intrinsic duty to provide the resources needed to form 
a family, whatever its institutional form. The widespread nature of births 
out of wedlock demonstrates that the legitimisation of a union by mar-
riage is an individual and private matter and not the expression of speci-
fic family models. The involvement of the State, however, is largely desi-
red by the population, whether in child-care or education16. In Russia 
the situation is perhaps more ambiguous, and one cannot really decide 
between two hypotheses. One is that, as in France, a long tradition of a 
welfare state has been assimilated by the population, even where there 
is inadequate family policy. The other is that the Russian model is a 
classical liberal one that separates matters concerning the family, left 
to the private sphere, from public affairs, which are the responsibility 
of the State. The extent of inter-generational transfers and the attitude 
towards the care one should give one’s elderly parents would appear to 
validate the second hypothesis of a classical liberal model in which the 
absence of State intervention and the insufficient aid it provides for the 
population need to be replaced by families17.
16. See the article in this issue by Cécile Lefèvre, Lidia Prokofieva, Irina Korchaguina, Vlada 
Stankuniene, Margarita Gedvilaite, Irina Badurashvili and Mariam Sirbiladze.
17. Ibidem.
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Union dissolutions are sharply marked by strictly demographic characte-
ristics and anthropological criteria (Figure 10). Demographic structure plays 
an important role in these dissolutions. Large early excess mortality among 
males in Russia and Lithuania inevitably leads to a structural imbalance 
between men and women, with the latter being widowed earlier. Family iso-
lation is thus sharply differentiated between men and women (Figure 9). In 
France, union dissolutions are more synchronous between men and women, 
because they are mainly due not to death but separation (Figure 10). On the 
other hand, separation clearly marks out France and Russia from the other 
two, with a great similarity in extent and changes over time: at present only 
70% of unions in France last ten years; in Russia the figure is slightly higher. 
Lithuania and Georgia are different. Unions are more stable and dissolu-
tions less frequent, particularly in Georgia. Georgian patriarchal framework 
and family control and the importance of religion in Lithuania once more 
find expression, marking a contrast with France and Russia.
3.4. vAlueS And SoCiAl ChAnge
Examination of attitudes towards the family, gender relations and 
homosexuality also reveals a combination of persistent models from dif-
ferent systems, and the rapid changes experienced by the population in all 
four countries.
Attitudes to homosexuality have radically altered. Although a majority 
of cohorts born in Russia in the 1930s disapprove of homosexual beha-
viour18, only a minority of the younger cohorts born in the early 1980s 
still do. The figures shift from over 70% of men and women born in 1930 
disapproving of equal rights to one man in two and two women in five born 
in 1980. The attitude of the various cohorts also differs in France, where 
results are similar to Russia. But they are much more numerous in accep-
ting equal treatment. Only one man in five and one woman in ten born in 
1980 strongly disapprove of equal rights. Of those born in 1930, more than 
half did so. Lithuania falls between the two, although the downward trend 
is similar to the first two countries. Only Georgia is distinguished by strong 
disapproval with little change between cohorts.
More generally, the holding of certain values reveals gender relations 
within society and the family. The relations are changing in different ways 
and there are sharp contrasts between the four countries under study. For 
example, the specialisation of mainly female tasks in housework has hardly 
changed in Russia, while change has been extremely rapid in France, and 
similar, if slower, in Lithuania. When asked “Please tell me who does the 
following tasks in your household?” fewer than one-third of Frenchwomen 
18. More exactly, these cohorts consider that homosexual couples should not have the same 
rights as heterosexual couples.
born in the 1980s said that they were the only ones to do such tasks as coo-
king, buying food, housework and organising the household’s social life. 
Proportions are higher in Lithuania, but the trend is similar. In Russia, on 
the other hand, 80% of women state that they alone do the cooking, and 
in Georgia there is a definite stability, although there has been a surprising 
decline in this figure in the most recent years. In Georgia, this is probably 
due to men’s much greater economic control over women, who are thus 
dependent and not those who acquire consumer goods. Georgian women 
appear to be restricted to the domestic sphere and largely absent from the 
public sphere, including the acquisition of household goods.
***
The history of families in the second half of the 20th century reveals a 
diversity that does not merely correspond to the division between Eastern 
and Western Europe, or to anthropological features rooted in earlier his-
tory. It is affected by trends that involve the whole of Europe, beginning in 
some countries in the late 1960s and in others in the early 1980s: marriage 
is no longer virtually the sole sign of a stable union; the various stages in 
entering adulthood are no longer automatically connected, with an appa-
rently natural succession of completing education, leaving home, first job, 
forming a union and birth of the first child. Although age at leaving home 
appears fairly stable, as one gains independence from one’s parents, pro-
bably expressing a social representation of adulthood that is firmly ent-
renched, the other stages no longer occur in the same order and are not 
connected in the same fashion. These changes are probably most marked 
in France and only just beginning in the formerly Soviet countries. But 
signs of a dispersal of these stages can be seen elsewhere too.
These changes began at various dates in the four countries under study, 
but have all been significant. Which is not to say that the new political, eco-
nomic and social reshaping of Europe will lead to a single pattern, a Euro-
pean family, with no traces of its recent past, earlier history, or cultural 
factors. On the contrary, the most important choices the individual faces, 
marriage or informal union, birth of a first child, less connected now with 
marriage or forming a couple, leave room, perhaps more than before, for 
the expression of a marked cultural and anthropological diversity, within 
the general pattern we have described. Policy decisions, however, remain 
determining factors, not in modifying these major trends but in adapting 
them. Finally, the traces of past membership of quite specific political areas 
remain, even if they are already fading.
This introduction and the articles that follow, examining in greater 
detail aspects touched on above, provide no predictions about what the 
European family of the future will be. But they do show the diversity of 
choices available for contemporary families, making them without doubt 
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more sensitive to external changes, whether socio-economic or political. 
One may suppose that the family will retain a central place in modern 
society, with many variations across the diverse regions of Europe, varia-
tions in the types of support and solidarity for family members, the timing 
of entering adulthood, and expectations from the State.
figure 11
Values — attitudes to homosexuality, religious marriage 
and support for parents
N.B.: inverted vertical scale
figure 12 
Gender values – attitude to sexual differentiation of housework tasks
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Appendix 1
Synthèse de la réalisation des enquêtes GGS de la première vague en 
France, Russie, Géorgie et Lituanie.
Annexe 2
Plan du questionnaire de référence (core questionnaire)
1. Ménage : description du logement, liste des membres du ménage, sexe, 
date de naissance et liens entre eux.
2. Enfants : répartition des tâches parentales, mode de garde des enfants et 
coûts, description des enfants non présents dans le ménage (enfants non coha-
bitants, enfants décédés, beaux-enfants).
3. Conjoints : précisions sur le conjoint actuel, cohabitant ou non, statut 
matrimonial, intentions de se marier ou de vivre avec un conjoint dans les 
trois années à venir, mode de vie, histoires conjugales passées.
4. Organisation du ménage et caractéristiques du couple : répartition des 
tâches domestiques, prise de décisions au sein du couple, entente entre les 
conjoints, gestion des désaccords.
5. Parents et foyer parental : enfance, mode de vie des parents du répondant, 
départ du foyer parental, fréquence des contacts parents-enfants, fratrie du 
répondant, grands-parents.
6. Fécondité : grossesses en cours, planification des naissances, méthodes 
contraceptives, difficultés à avoir des enfants, intentions de fécondité, influence 
de l’entourage sur la décision d’avoir d’autres enfants, préférence quant au 
sexe des enfants.
7. Santé et bien-être : maladie ou handicap, difficultés au quotidien, aides 
reçues ou données, soutien psychologique, bien-être moral.
8. Activité et revenus du répondant : profession, horaires de travail, régula-
rité du travail, satisfaction et intentions de changer d’emploi, de prendre sa 
retraite.
9. Activité et revenus du conjoint : profession, temps de travail, régularité du 
travail.
10. Biens du ménage, revenus et héritages : biens et revenus de l’ensemble du 
ménage, possession de biens spécifiques, aisance matérielle, transferts intra et 
intergénérationnels, aides et allocations reçues, possibilité d’épargner.
11. Valeurs et attitudes : religion, opinions sur la famille, sur les relations 
entre ses membres et sur les relations de genre dans la famille et la société, 
opinions sur la politique et sur la religion.
Sites : 
www-erfi.ined.fr
www.unece.org/pau/ggp/materials.htm
